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Abstract
The higher the relative quality of the products of domestic firms, the greater their equi­
librium outputs and prices, and the more are those prices affected by exchange rate 
fluctuations. If domestic firms produce relatively low quality varieties, their equilibrium 






















































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
Drawing heavily on Cusumano (1985), one can list the following stylized facts from the 
history of the world automobile industry:
1. from the end of World War II through the early 1960s, Japanese cars were perceived 
by consumers as being of low quality;
2. during this period, Japanese cars were not especially successful on world markets;
3. however, they were protected against foreign competition in their home market by 
government measures that were rationalized, at least in part, on “infant industry” 
grounds, and during this period made substantial efforts to raise quality;
4. by the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese cars were perceived by consumers as being of 
high quality, and became immensely successful on world markets.
In the imperfectly competitive world automobile industry, it appears, consumers’ 
perception of quality changes slowly and is a  critical determinant of market performance. 
Yet while there have been important advances in our ability to model vertical product 
differentiation (Cremer and Thisse, 1991; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983, 1987) and 
in the application of models of imperfect competition to the traditional questions of 
international economics (Greenaway, 1987; Gatsios, 1989; Krugman, 1989), it remains 
to explore the impact of vertical product differentiation on intra-industry trade. In this 
paper, I present a model of vertical product differentiation that generalizes a standard 
model of homogeneous-product oligopoly. This allows the analysis of intra-industry 
trade flows and the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to domestic prices in 
a way that is comparable to results in the literature (Brander, 1981; Markusen, 1981; 
Phlips and Martin, 1993). The model also yields a protect-quality rationale for infant 
industry protection.
2 D u o p o ly  w ith  V ertica l P ro d u ct D ifferen tia tio n
2.1 D em and
Leaving aside questions of international trade for the moment, in this section I lay out 
the simplest possible version of a model of oligopoly with vertical product differentiation: 
quantity-setting duopoly. There are two firms, 1 and 2. Each firm produces a single 
variety, and associated with each variety is a quality index f. The impact of quality on 




























































































will pay for it, and the less consumers will pay for other products, holding outputs 
constant. Linear inverse demand curves with these characteristics are*
Pi =  Ci“ ~  Ci<7i -  (1)
Vi =  62a -  V &  ~  (2)
An increase in £1 increases the price-axis intercept of variety l ’s demand curve, 
and makes it steeper (less elastic). An increase in £1 also shifts variety 2’s demand curve 
toward the origin. Equations (1) and (2) can be derived from a quadratic representative 
utility function:
u — m  + a (fjÇi +  Ç2Q1) -  ^  ^Çi9i +  £\£i<li<)i +  £292)  (3)
where m represents “all other goods” . This is a common and sometimes a convenient 
procedure. Its weaknesses should be noted (Kirman, 1992). If this formulation is ac­
cepted, then fi is seen as an index of the marginal utility of variety i relative to the 
marginal utility of all other goods (which is normalized at one).
2.2 Equilibrium
The experience of the world automobile industry suggests that firms are able to change 
perceived product quality much less rapidly than price or output.2 For this reason, 
I assume that firms treat product qualities as given when they maximize profit, and 
examine comparative static changes in market equilibrium as product qualities change 
parametrically. If each firm produces with constant marginal cost c per unit, quantity 
reaction curves are
(4)
Qi +  2q2 =  a - (5)
divid ing  equation (1) by and equation (2) by f2> one obtains inverse demand curves written in 
terms of price per unit quality. As is usual in models of this kind, the assumption that the coefficient 
of own output in the equation of the inverse demand curve is made without loss of generality.
2The “Coca Cola Classic” episode suggests that firms may have difficulty changing perceived product 
quality, or at least that consumers may react in unpredictable ways to attempts to change product 
quality. Hotelling (1929) assumed that firms could costlessly change location, the spatial analoque of 
product type. This assumption is abandoned by Prescott and Visscher (1977) and the literature that 




























































































The implied Cournot equilibrium outputs and prices are3
Pi =  c +  £i<?i (8)
P2 =  c +  {2?2 (9)
(Equations (8) and (9) are implied directly by the reaction functions.)
It is apparent from (6) and (8) that the equilibrium values of q\ and p\ rise as fi 
rises and fall as & rises. Since firm l ’s equilibrium profit is =  fi(<7i)2, 7T] is affected 
in the same way by changes in qualities. (7) and (9) yield corresponding comparative 
static relations for variety 2.
All of these results hold provided equilibrium outputs are nonnegative. The case 
in which this condition is violated is explored below.
3 In tr a -in d u str y  Trade w ith  V ertica l P r o d u c t D if­
feren tia tion
3.1 D em and
1 wish to  examine intra-industry trade between two countries, A and B. The model is 
static. There are A firms in country A and B firms in country B. Inverse demand curves 
generalize those of the duopoly case outlined above. The price of each variety depends 
on the outputs and qualities of all varieties. In the most general case, each variety would 
have a distinct quality parameter. For simplicity and tractabilitv, but also because it does 
not seem too far removed from the stylized facts of the automobile industry, I assume 
tha t in each country there is a common quality parameter for all varieties produced in 
the same country. Country A inverse demand curves are
Paa  =  £a a °- — £a a {qai + <M2 +  •••• +  Qa a ) — ^ Z a a Zb a  (x b \ +  ■■■ +  x b b ) (10)
horizon tal product differentiation can be introduced by adding a product differentiation parameter 
0, which for substitute varieties would lie between 0 and 1, to the inverse demand curves. The inverse 
demand curve for variety 1 would then be
Pi =  f ia  -  fi9i -  ^ \/€ i€2<72-
This is equivalent to generalizing the Spence (1976) model of product differentiation to include quality 
differences. The resulting inverse demand curves can be inverted to obtain demand curves and investigate 




























































































Pba  = £bao- — \ j  Ì a a Ì b a {qa\ + QA2 + ■••• + Qa a ) — £b a (x b i  + + Xb b ) (11)
£aa is the quality index of country A varieties in country A and £ba is the quality 
index of country B varieties in country A. qAi is the sales of country A firm i in country 
A; Zflj is the export sales of country B firm j in country A.
In like manner, country B inverse demand curves are
Pab  — £a b Q — ^a b {^a \ + 1/12 + ••• + x a a ) — \J^a b ^b b (.Qbi + •••• + Qb a ) (12)
Pab  = f bbo. — \J(;a b £b b (xa i + %A2 + ••• + Xa a ) — £b b (qbi + •••• + Qb a ) (13)
In this formulation, there is no necessary connection between the quality valuation 
of a variety in different countries.4
3.2 Equilibrium
Firm A l’s profit is
kai =  (Paa — c)qAi +  (epAB — c)i/u, (14)
where the exchange rate e converts country B currency into country A currency. By 
continuing to assume that firms operate with constant returns to scale, we separate sales 
decisions in the two countries. Firm A l’s quantity reaction function for country A is
2 7/ti +  9/12 +  ... +  9/i/i + 1 / “--- (^Bl +  •••X b b ) —
V 4/t/i
(15)
There are similar reaction functions for every other firm for country A. Symmetry 
implies that in equilibrium every country A firm will sell the same amount in country 
A (9̂ ) and every country B firm will sell the same amount in country A (x b). We can 
impose symmetry on the quantity reaction functions to obtain two condensed reaction 
functions that can be solved for country A equilibrium outputs:
c
= <1~ ~ U a
(16)
ec (17)
= a ~ ^ ~ A
Thus in equilibrium, firm sales in country A are
QA ----------------------a T b T T ------------------- (18;
4Two polar cases may be distinguished. If £AA =  £a b  =  and £ba  =  €b b  =  €b , then varieties have 
the same quality image in both countries. (For example, consumers in both countries believe Japanese 
cars are of high quality.) On the other hand, if £AA =  €b b  > €a b  =  €b a , consumers in each country 




























































































XA = (19)A + B + l
It is apparent that in equilibrium an increase in £aa increases qA and reduces x b - 
An increases in £ba has opposite effects. Combining the equations of the inverse demand 
curves and the reaction functions, we find that in equilibrium
Paa = c + £aaQa (20)
Pba = ec + £baQa (21)
This allows us to evaluate the impact of an increase in e — a devaluation of the 












(23) implies that the passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations to the country A 
price of country B varieties is invariant to product quality. But (22) shows that the 
price of domestic varieties is more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, the greater 
the quality of domestic varieties relative to the quality of foreign varieties. This reflects 
the fact tha t paa is greater, the greater is f aaK ba■
4 P ro d u ct Q u ality  and Infant In d u stry  P r o te c tio n
Return to equation (18), which gives equilibrium domestic firm output in country A. qA 
is nonnegative if and only if
^  (a " (“ “ £ )  {24)
The left-hand side of (24) rises as £4/1 rises, and the right-hand side of (24) rises 
as £ba rises. The right-hand side of (24) also rises as B rises. It follows that if E,Aa 
is sufficiently small, and £ba sufficiently large, inequality (24) will be violated and the 
Cournot equilibrium output of country A firms in the country A market will be zero. 
If domestic firms produce low-quality varieties in competition with many foreign firms 
tha t produce high quality varieties, they may be driven from their home market. For 
the many markets in which a relatively long time period is required to improve product 
quality, government protection of the home market may be called for if domestic firms 




























































































5 C on clu sion
Vertical product differentiation is a critical determinant of market performance in oligopoly 
and of intra-industry trade flows in imperfectly competitive markets. The model exam­
ined here suggests that the higher the relative quality of the products of domestic firms, 
the greater their equilibrium outputs and prices, and the more are those prices affected 
by exchange rate fluctuations. If domestic firms produce relatively low quality vari­
eties, their equilibrium output may be zero. This offers a rationale for “infant industry” 
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